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NOTES

THE WAR WITH WORDS: THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE
INITIATIVE IN LIGHT OF THE ABM TREATY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1775, John Adams wrote that "[w]hen a great question is first
started, there are very few, even of the greatest minds, which suddenly
and intuitively comprehend it, in all of its consequences."' Such has
been true with President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
From its inception, few commentators have concurred on the legal, political, and scientific prospects of the program. One such "consequence," as noted by President Adams, that has been sharply disputed
is the relationship between the Strategic Defense Initiative and the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty).'
Of particular importance today is the considerable controversy
that has arisen regarding the correct interpretation of the ABM
Treaty. Critics of SDI argue that the program, once beyond the research stage, will inevitably violate the Treaty and its accompanying
documents.' The Reagan Administration, on the other hand, contends
1. R. Blecker, Constitutional Supremacy and Nullification in Ancient Greece 1 (1983)
(unpublished manuscript available in New York Law School Copy Center).
2. Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-United Soviet Socialist Republic,
23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972) [hereinafter ABM
Treaty or Treaty].
3. See Longstreth, Pike, and Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic
Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty, March 1985 (report for the National
Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty). See also infra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
Other critics include G. Smith, How the Administration Amended the Treaty, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1985, at A22, col. 3 [hereinafter G. Smith, ABM Treaty]; Wicker, Subverting a Treaty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at A27, col. 5 [hereinafter Wicker]. See also
Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, The President'sChoice: Star Wars or Arms Control, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 264 (Winter 1984-85); Drell and Panofsky, The Case Against Strategic Defense: Technical and Strategic Realities, ISSUES SCI. AND TECH. 46 (Fall 1984);
Drell, Farley & Holloway, Preservingthe ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Initiative, 9 INT'L SECURITY 51 (Fall 1984); P. FARLEY & S. DRELL, THE REAGAN STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
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that the Treaty does not prohibit the research, testing, or development
of space-based defense systems," and that regardless, the program will
be consistent with all United States treaty obligations, including the
ABM Treaty.'
This Note will address: 1. the various interpretations of the ABM
Treaty in light of the Strategic Defense Initiative by analyzing (a) the
language of the agreement (the text), and (b) the intention of the parties that negotiated the agreement; and 2. the conditions upon which
the Treaty was piemised. Prior to this analysis, however, this Note will
discuss briefly the purpose and mechanics of the strategic defense program and the methods of treaty interpretation.
II.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

In 1932, Justice Brandeis wrote that the "[d]enial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation,"
and that if "we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold."' President Reagan proposed such an experiment when,
(1984); Glaser, Why Even Good Defense May Be Bad, 9 INT'L SECURITY 92 (Fall 1984);
Longstreth and Pike, U.S., Soviet Programs Threaten ABM Treaty, BULL. AToM. SCIENTISTS (April 1985); G. SMITH, DOUBLETAL& THE STORY OF SALT 1(1980); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE FALLACY OF STAR WARS (1984).
4. Reagan Proposes U.S. Seek New Ways to Block Missiles, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1983, at A21, col. 5. See Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1985) (transcript on file at N.Y. Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law) (statements of Robert C. McFarlane). See also infra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
5. THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. Jan.
1985). The President has stated that he intends to adhere to the terms of the ABM
Treaty. Gwertzman, Shultz FaultsMoscow Arms Plans But Calls "Real Progress"Possible, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at A6, col. 3 [hereinafter Gwertzman, Shultz Faults Moscow]. Shultz further stated that "our S.D.I. research program has been structured and, as
. . , will continue to be conducted in accordance with a
the President has reaffirmed.
restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations." Excerpts From a Speech by Shultz
at North Atlantic Assembly Meeting, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at A6, col. 1 [hereinafter Shultz Excerpts].
The more restrictive interpretation of the treaty is read to prohibit testing and development of space-based defensive missile systems and components, but may permit
experiments involving new kinds of technologies of subcomponents or adjuncts to actual
systems. Mohr, Star Wars' Dispute: Beyond the Administration's Debate Lies Question
of the Soviet Reaction, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A4, col. 3 [hereinafter Mohr, Star
Wars]. "This interpretation permits research into, but not testing or development of,
systems or components based on future technology and capable of substituting for ABM
interceptors, launchers, or radars." Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs 1 (Oct. 22, 1985) [hereinafter Sofaer].

6.

THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, supra note 5, at 1.
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on March 23, 1983,7 he called upon the nation's scientists and engineers to establish a comprehensive and intensive research program 8-the Strategic Defense Initiative-aimed at eventually eliminating the threat posed by nuclear armed ballistic missiles. 9 By exploiting
recent advances in ballistic missile defense technology,"0 the program is
designed to seek the means to establish a non-nuclear 1 layered defense2
that will destroy attacking missiles during each phase of their flight.1
7. President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. Times, Mar.
24, 1983, at A20, col. 1. See also President's Address to the Nation, National Security, 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 442 (Mar. 23, 1983).
8. The SDI program presently consists of:
research and development efforts in five broad technical areas: (1) surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment including the use of radar and
infrared technologies to discriminate between warheads and decoys; (2) directed
energy weapons such as lasers and particle beams; (3) kinetic energy weapons
such as high performance interceptor missiles and super-high velocity guns;
(4) systems analysis and battle management including development of the complex computer systems and communications networks needed to direct a massive, complicated defense system; and (5) survivability, lethality and support
programs designed to protect the system itself from enemy attacks.
COMMON CAUSE, STAR WARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE SPACE WEAPONS DEBATE, 12
(Feb. 1985) [hereinafter COMMON CAUSE].
9. Gwertzman, Shultz Faults Moscow, supra note 5, at A6.
10. Presently, five "futuristic technologies" are being considered as 'kill mechanisms'

for a space-based defense.

COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: FACT SHEET, 3 (Nov. 26, 1985) [hereinafter CNS REPORT]. These fall within several

categories of lasers, particle beams and more conventional self-propelled missiles
equipped with miniature homing vehicles. M. Smith, Legal Implications of a SpaceBased Ballistic Missile Defense, 15 CASE W. RES. INT'L L.J. 52, 55 (1985) [hereinafter M.
Smith, Space-Based BMD]. More specifically, these technologies consist of X-ray lasers,
chemical lasers, particle beams, and "smart rocks" (known as kinetic-energy projectiles).
CNS REPORT, supra, at 3, 4. For a detailed analysis of strategic defense systems and
technologies, see BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (A. Carter & D. Schwartz ed. 1984) [hereinafter Carter & Schwartz]. See also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SDI: A TECHNICAL PROGRESS REPORT, SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (June 1985).
11. Nuclear warheads no longer are required for an effective ballistic missile defense
(BMD). M. Smith, Space-Based BMD, supra note 10, at 55 (referring to Weinberger,
Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense 18 (Apr. 24, 1984)). In fact, the SDI
program has been directed to emphasize non-nuclear technologies. Id.
12. The multi-layered defense consists of the boost, post-boost, mid-course, and terminal phases. Id. at 56. Each phase is designed to correspond to the four phases of a
ballistic missile's trajectory. Id.
During the boost phase, the rocket's exhaust can be tracked and the multiple warheads have yet to be released. While this phase offers the most effective interception, it
also is the most difficult: detection, discrimination, targeting, and interception would
need to be accomplished generally within three minutes from the time the missile is
launched. Id. at 56 n.25.
During the post-boost phase, "individual re-entry vehicles are being sequentially
deployed by a maneuverable 'bus.' "Id. at 56-57 n.26. During this stage it is still possible

N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 8

As a result of this program, a future President and the Congress will
possess the technical knowledge necessary to support a decision on
whether to develop and deploy such advanced defensive systems.13 In
the meantime, policymakers must determine whether such a decision,
if and when it is rendered, will violate the ABM Treaty.
III.

TREATY INTERPRETATION: THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES

On October 6, 1985, Robert C. McFarlane, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs,"' publicly advanced an interpretation of the Treaty that approved and authorized" the testing and
development of the ABM systems and components based on "new
technologies"' and "new physical concepts.""7 Critics of this position,
however, contend that Mr. McFarlane and the Reagan Administration
seem to be misinterpreting and repudiating the Treaty, 8 which is presently the only bilateral arms control agreement in full force and effect
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 9 In an attempt to
discover the appropriate method to interpret the ABM Treaty, a review of the rules and canons of treaty interpretation is in order.
to destroy several warheads at once, since they have not yet separated.
In the mid-course phase, the missile booster drops off and the warheads and decoys
begin their flights through outerspace. CNS REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. The individual
re-entry vehicles travel for twenty to twenty-five minutes before re-entering the earth's
atmosphere. Id. To be effective, the defense system must be able to distinguish between
debris, decoys, and re-entry vehicles. M. Smith, Space-Based BMD, supra note 10, at 57
n.27.
During the terminal phase, the missiles re-enter the atmosphere. At the same time,
the decoys and penetration aids are slowed down and burned up. Although the defense
system is more easily able to discriminate between the warheads and decoys, there are
only approximately sixty seconds for interception. CNS REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
For a complete discussion on the layered defense, see generally Carter & Schwartz,
supra note 10. See also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE STRATEGIC
DEFENSE INITIATIVE (1985).
13. The Strategic Defense Initiative research program is designed to determine
whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies can contribute to the realization
of the President's vision. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 1

(June 1985) [hereinafter

STATE DEPARTMENT,

SDI].

14. Mr. McFarlane commonly is referred to as the National Security Advisor.
15. Mohr, U.S. Negotiators of ABM Treaty Say Reagan is 'Harpooning'Pact, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at A14, col. 1 [hereinafter Mohr, U.S. HarpooningPact].
16. Gwertzman, Shultz Faults Moscow, supra note 5, at A6. See supra note 10.
17. Mohr, U.S. Harpooning Pact, supra note 15, at A14, col. 1. See supra note 10.
18. Mohr, U.S. Harpooning Pact, supra note 15, at A14, col. 1.
19. Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the
ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1956 (1986).
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 20 (Vienna Convention) provides the general rules concerning the interpretation of international agreements. 2 As agreed to during the negotiating period, the
Commission2 2 adopted "a 'basic approach' which demands merely the
ascription of a meaning to a text."2 Although Professor McDougal opposed the Commission's view as "an impossible, conformity-imposing
textuality,"2' 4 the Commission concluded that "the text [of a treaty]
must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of
the parties [and that] the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into
the intentions of the parties."25
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that "[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty. '26 Consequently, this view as20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27. [hereinafter Vienna Convention] For a reprint of the official
document, see 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969).
21. M. Smith, Spaced-Based BMD, supra note 10, at 62.
22. The International Law Commission was the organization primarily responsible
for the adoption of the Law of Treaties. See Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties,
64 A.J.I.L. 495 (1970).
23. McDougal, The InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles Upon Interpretation: Textuality 'Redivivus,' 61 A.J.I.L. 992 (1967).
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting the Report of the International Law Commission, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966) (reprinted in 61 A.J.I.L. 248 (1967)).
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, at 63 A.J.I.L. 875, 885. Article 31 in its entirety reads:
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
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sumes that texts have plain and natural meanings that do not require
interpretation.2 7 Justice Holmes, however, noted in Towne v. Eisner
that "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the
skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."28
Words, then, have no ordinary or natural meaning in isolation from
their context and from the other elements of interpretation." Therefore, despite its emphasis upon the "ordinary meaning" of the text,2 0the
Commission cannot escape references to the intent of the parties
Oddly enough, the Commission may have recognized the shortcomings of the textual approach when it drafted Article 32.3 'That article permits recourse to "supplementary means of interpretation" when
the interpretation of a treaty pursuant to Article 31 "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure."3 Since Article 32 admittedly does not list
so intended.
Id.
Professor McDougal disfavors the "blindness and arbitrariness" of the "ordinary
meaning" requirement. McDougal, supra note 23, at 993. When serving as the exclusive
index, interpretation based on the text of a document is "an exercise in primitive and
potentially destructive formalism." Id. at 997. Specifically, he objects to the manner in
which the Commission confines "context" and "object and purpose" to "mere text," the
latter (object and purpose) being entirely "intrinsic to the text." Id. at 993-94.
Instead of the Commission's rigid adherence to "textuality," McDougal favors interpretation based on the intent of the parties. Id.
The truth is that in the absence of a comprehensive, contextual examination
of all the potentially significant features of the process of agreement, undertaken
without the blinders of advance restrictive hierarchies or weightings, no interpreter can be sure that his determinations bear any relation to the genuine
shared expectations of the parties.
Id. at 998.
27. See id. at 996.
28. 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
29. See McDougal, supra note 23, at 995-06 n.23 (quoting Professor Briggs from the

1966 I.L.C.
30.
31.

YEARBOOK

(I), pt. II, at 188).

See id. at 997 n.28.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, at 885. Article 32 reads:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
32. Id. The "supplementary means" provided for in Article 32 are not limited to
"preparatory work" or "the circumstances of the [treaty's] conclusion." Rather, the
means suggested are illustrative, and therefore not exhaustive. See infra note 33 and
accompanying text.

19871

SDI AND THE ABM TREATY

all of the available "supplementary means," it may be presumed that
the intent of the parties is to be included. That is, since the parties'
intent is not prohibited from consideration, it should not be
33
precluded.
Thus, as suggested by Professor McDougal, "the text of the treaty
and the common meanings of the words should be made the point of
departure of interpretation, but not the end of the enquiry and that
the text should be treated as but one important index among many of
the common intent of the parties."3' 4 Therefore, one should consider, in
addition to the text, "the circumstances of the parties at the time the
treaty was entered into, the change in the circumstances sought to be
effected, and the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is be35
ing made.

IV.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE

ABM

TREATY AND THE STRATEGIC

DEFENSE INITIATIVE

The debate over the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty focuses on the Treaty's application to "futuristic" or "exotic" ABM systems and components, that is, those devices based on physical principles other than those that existed when the Treaty was signed.3 ' As
framed by the Honorable Abraham D. Sofaer 3 7 the primary issue,
therefore, is whether the United States and the Soviet Union may develop and test exotic ballistic missile defenses, such as those contemplated by the Strategic Defense Initiative, within the boundaries of the
ABM Treaty.3
As noted previously, opponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative
argue that the program does, or will, violate the Treaty.3 9 One such
33. The "elements referred to in [Articles 31 and 32] are not exhaustive of the guidelines to which recourse may be had in the process of interpretation." Stanford, United
Nations Law of Treaties Conference: First Session, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 59, 64 (1967)
[hereinafter Stanford]. On the same topic, see Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law
of Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 47 (1970).
As stated by McDougal, to base an interpretation entirely on a textual analysis "may
be to impose upon one or both of the parties an agreement they never made." McDougal,
supra note 23, at 998.
34. Stanford, supra note 33, at 63.
35. McDougal, supra note 23, at 100.
36. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statement D, 23 U.S.T. at 3456, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503, at 22.
37. Formerly a district judge of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
38. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARv. L. REV.
1972 (1986) [hereinafter Sofaer, SDI].
39. See supra note 3; see also infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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critic, Gerard C. Smith, the chief negotiator of the agreement, asserts
that the Treaty prohibits, as it was intended to prohibit, the development, testing, and deployment of all ABM systems, including those
that are space-based.40 This intention is reflected by Article 141 and
Article V42 of the Treaty.
Article 1(2) of the Treaty, for instance, declares each party's assurance not to deploy a nationwide defense against strategic ballistic missiles or to provide a base for such a defense. 3 Similarly, Article V(1)
provides that both the United States and the Soviet Union undertake
"not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are
sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."44
Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes 45 concur with the "straightforward" and "comprehensive" prohibition of Article V(1), while noting that Article 11(1) of the Treaty offers an "equally sweeping" definition of ABM systems: "For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system
is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in
flight trajectory, currently consisting of . . .(a) ABM interceptor
missiles, . . . (b) ABM launchers, . . .
and (c) ABM radars.
.. .4 Based on this language, the Chayes argue that "Article
40. G. Smith, ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at A22, col. 3. See infra notes 43-56 and
accompanying text.
41. Article 11(2) of the Treaty provides: "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM
systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a
defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as
provided for in Article III of this Treaty." ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. 11(2), 23
U.S.T. at 3438, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 4.
42. Id. art. V, 23 U.S.T. at 3441, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 7.
43. See supra note 41. Article I of the Treaty sets forth also the parties' commitment
to limit ABM systems so that, except as permitted by Article III, such systems are not
deployed. Article I(1), however, acknowledges also the parties' intentions "to adopt other
measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." ABM Treaty, supra note 2,
art. I(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3438, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 4 (emphasis added). The "other measures" alluded to by Article I are discussed in the preamble and Article XI of the Treaty:
They call for the achievement of "effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,
nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament" and the commitment to
"continue active neogotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms," respectively.
Id., 23 U.S.T. at 3437, 3443, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 3. For the view that the limitations
placed on ABM systems are contingent upon the attainment of these "other measures,"
see infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 42.
45. Abram Chayes, the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard University,
and Antonia Handler Chayes, the Chairman of Endispute, Inc., authored a commentary
on the "reinterpretation" of the ABM Treaty that appeared recently in the Harvard Law
Review. See supra note 19.
46. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. 11(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3439, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 5
(emphasis added).
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II is on its face a functional definition. It defines the prohibited systems on the basis of performance, not technology. . . .The natural
reading of the phrase 'currently consisting of' makes the system
description that follows illustrative, not limiting.""7 That is, the ABM
Treaty bans systems designed to "counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory," not merely systems comprised of
ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. 8 According to this
argument, then, the definition of ABM systems in Article 11(1) includes
future as well as conventional, or current, systems. Article V does not
create an exception for those systems and components that do not
"currently consist of" 1972 technology.
An exception to the Article V prohibition, however, even under the
"restrictive" reading of the agreement, does exist in the Treaty. Article
III explicitly permits each party to deploy fixed land-based ABM systems at two sites-one "centered on the Party's national capital," the
other "containing ICBM silo launchers."4' 9 This exception subsequently
is noted in Agreed Statement D 50 of the Treaty, which provides:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided
in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event
ABM systems based on other physical principles and including
47. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19, at 1958 (emphasis in original).
48. Accord Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon on the Strategic
Arms Limitation Agreement, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 3, 6 (1972) ("Article 11(1) defines an
ABM system in terms of its function as 'a system to counter strategic missiles or their
elements in flight trajectory,' noting that such systems 'currently' consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars."); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19, at
1965 ("[T]he definition of ABM systems in Article II is cast in terms of system function
rather than systems technology, and covers future as well as 'current' systems.") (emphasis added).
49. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. III, 23 U.S.T. at 3440, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 6. On
July 3, 1974, however, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a protocol that
reduced the number of permissible sites to one. Protocol on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 1645, 1648, T.I.A.S. No. 8276 at 3.
50. Agreed Statement D was one of seven Agreed Statements consented to and initialed by the heads of the United States and Soviet Delegations on May 26, 1972. "The
statements were used as a drafting device to clarify specific points or remote possible'
ambiguities in more general language in the body of the Treaty. They were transmitted
to the Senate as part of the Treaty." Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19, at 1961-62 (footnote omitted).
As provided by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
entire treaty, including any agreements which the parties made in connection with the
Treaty, should be considered when determining the Treaty's meaning. See M. Smith,
Space-Based BMD, supra note 10, at 62. For the text of, and a discussion on, Article 31
of the Vienna Convention, see supra note 26.
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components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future,
specific limitations on such systems and their components
would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII
and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.5'
Chayes and Chayes argue that Agreed Statement D applies solely
to the Article III exception. In support of this position, they write:
[T]he Agreed Statement does indicate that it is confined
to fixed land-based systems. The inducing clause recites that
its purpose is to 'insure the fulfillment of the obligation not to
deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided
in Article III of the Treaty.' And as we have seen, the deployments permitted under Article III are fixed land-based systems
using 1970-type technology. 2
Ambassador Smith also points to Agreed Statement D, which, he
claims, provides that if new type systems are developed, they cannot
be deployed unless authorized by treaty amendment. 3 Furthermore,
in the event that any ambiguities do exist as to the proper meaning of
the text or the negotiating record,5' the Treaty provides for the establishment of a reviewing body55 to clarify such situations.5
A closer look at the text of the Treaty, though, reveals another
interpretation, perhaps even more in keeping with the drafters' intentions. The basis of this interpretation, by now obvious, is the Treaty's
51. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statement D, 23 U.S.T. at 3456, T.I.A.S. No.
7503, at 22 (emphasis added).
52. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19, at 1962 (emphasis added). Similarly, the authors note that "Agreed Statement D clarifies Article III by making explicit this prohibition against replacing any or all of the permitted deployments by exotic fixed-land based
systems, except with the concurrence of the other party." Id. at 1965.
Ambassador Smith argues more generally that the Agreed Statement does not modify the "total ban" on the development and testing of space-based systems, as provided
for by Article V. See G. Smith, ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at A22, col. 3.
53. G. Smith, ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at A22, col. 3. For an analysis of the "unless authorized" phrase, see infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. For the Treaty's
amendment provision, see ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIV, 23 U.S.T. at 3445,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 11.
54. G. Smith, ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at A22, col. 3.
55. Article XIII(1) of the Treaty provides for the creation of a "Standing Consultative Commission" to resolve disputes arising from ambiguities in the agreement. ABM
Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3444-45, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 at 10-11. See
infra note 77.
56. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3444-45, T.I.A.S. No.
7503 at 10-11.
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application to future systems and components.5 7 To this end, Judge
Sofaer suggests that the "development and testing of such systems
based on physical principles other than those understood in 1972 is
5' 8
wholly justified.
Although Article V(1) does indeed appear to prohibit the development, testing, and deployment of all ABM systems and components,59
it instead may be read to apply only to those "physical principles" that
were known when the Treaty"0 was negotiated and signed."' This interpretation is supported by the "ordinary meaning" of Article II and
Agreed Statement D.
The dispositive language of Article II, suggesting a "broader" interpretation of the Treaty, clearly is the phrase "currently consisting
of." Contrary to the functional definition proffered by proponents of
the "restrictive" view, Judge Sofaer argues that:
[tihe article Il(1) definition can reasonably be read to
mean that, for the purposes of the Treaty, an 'ABM system' is
one that serves the functions described and that consists of the
type of components that existed 'currently' (that is, at the time
the Treaty was signed). According to this reading, the parties
listed the three components not merely to cite the systems that
happened then to be in use, but also to limit the scope of the
article I(1) definition to ABM systems based on physical prin62
ciples then in use.
Had the negotiators intended the phrase also to include all future systems, words to that effect would have been used. Rather than reading
"currently consisting of," the drafters most certainly would have cho57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text, and infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
58. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 2. Ambassador Nitze draws a similar conclusion, stating
that "the possibility [that] new technolbgies [were] foreseen is clear from the language of
the treaty." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NITZE, SDI AND THE ABM TREATY 3 (1985) [hereinafter
NITZE,

59.

SDI

AND

ABMI.

See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. V(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3441, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at

7.
60. In addition to the text, reference here to the Treaty includes the Agreed Statements. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statements A-G, 23 U.S.T. at 3456-57,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 22-23.
61. See Sofaer, supra note 5, at 5.
62. Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1974 (emphasis in original).
63. But see Sherr, Legal Issues of the "Star Wars" Defense Program, 16 TOL. L. REv.
125 (1984) [hereinafter Sherr]. "The natural interpretationof article II is that the word
'currently' was used to ensure that the listing of the 1972-era devices would not artificially freeze in time the definition of what constituted ABM system components." Id. at
132 (emphasis added).
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sen "currently consisting of but not limited to." 6
Article 11(2) further supports this interpretation. This section
states that the ABM system components listed in Article II(1) "include
those
which
are:
(a) operational;
(b) under
construction;
(c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion;
or (e) mothballed. ' 6 5 As in the preceding section, the list provided
6
here, as the language indicates, is limited to existing components. 1
Components not listed in Section 2, subsections (a) through (e), therefore, are not prohibited by the Treaty.67 "Had the negotiators intended
to bring future technologies within the purview of Article II(1), they
could have added 'undergoing research' or 'developed in the future' to
the litany of components in Article 11(2).""
Perhaps most significant is that systems and components based on
future technology are not discussed anywhere in the Treaty except in
64. Although he does not explain why such qualifying language was not considered,
Sherr notes that "a member of the United States negotiating team" believed that the
word "currently" was deliberately inserted into the text "at the time agreement was
reached on the future systems ban [Agreed Statement DI in order to have the very effect
of closing a loophole to the ban on [future ABM systems]." Id. (quoting R. Garthoff,
Reply to Letter to the Editor, 2 INT'L SECURITY 107-09 (1977)). Dr. Raymond Garthoff
was the Executive Secretary and a Senior Advisor in the United States Delegation that
negotiated the Treaty. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19, at 1959.
65. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. 11(2), 23 U.S.T. at 3439, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 5.
66. See Sofaer, supra note 5, at 5; Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1974. But see Note,
The Legality of President Reagan's Proposed Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense
System, 14 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 329, 342 (1984) (authored by John Topping) [hereinafter Topping].
67. Topping contends that "[a]ny development of such a system based on 'other
physical principles' would . . . violate the spirit of the Treaty." Topping, supra note
66, at 342 (emphasis added). Other nations, he argues, undoubtedly would object to our
failure to adhere to the spirit of the accord. While certain space-based ABM systems
could be tested and developed without technically violating the Treaty because of the
Treaty's ambiguities, any such action certainly would "evoke criticism from the international community." Id. at 354.
Without considering the intentions of the parties who negotiated the agreement,
however, who is to say whether the "spirit" of the Treaty includes (or excludes) ABM
systems based on future technology? Indeed, it is quite plausible that the spirit of the
Treaty extends only as far as those systems based on known (1972-era) technology, since
it was the failure of existing defenses that prompted the United States and the Soviet
Union to negotiate the ABM Treaty. "One of the primary motivations for the ABM
Treaty was the ineffectiveness of both the United States and Soviet systems. Had either
side developed an effective ABM system at this eary stage [the 1950's and 1960's], it is
unlikely that the treaty would ever have been signed." Id. at 331 n.9. See Willrich,
SALT: An Appraisal, in SALT: THE Moscow AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND 256, 263-64 (M.

Willrich & J. Rhinelander eds. 1974).
68. Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1974 n.9.
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Agreed Statement D. 69 Essentially, Agreed Statement D provides that
in the event that future or exotic ABM systems, that include components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers,
or radars, "are created in the future, specific limitations on such sys",70
tems and their components would be subject to discussion.
By its very nature, this provision presupposes that futuristic systems
already have been tested and developed, prior to discussions to negotiate specific limitations: "[I]t requires that limitations on such systems
be stipulated only after creation of the systems. 7 1 Hence, discussions
cannot be held until ABM systems based on "other physical principles" are developed. Alternatively, until limitations are negotiated, no
such prohibiton exists.
Accordingly, Agreed Statement D does not set forth a "total ban
on the development and testing of space-based systems."" The provision never even refers to development or testing; instead, only deployment is considered." Moreover, the Agreed Statement indicates that,
within the framework of the agreement, future technologies are being
considered for the first time. If Article II was intended to encompass
all systems and components based on present and future technology,
Agreed Statement D would not have been necessary. 74 The very fact
that the Agreed Statement was added-to qualify the meaning of those
terms-suggests that Article II extends only to those systems and components "based on then-utilized physical principles, not to those based
69. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statement D, 23 U.S.T. at 3456, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503, at 22; Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1975.
70. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statement D, 23 U.S.T. at 3456, T.I.A.S. No.
7503, at 22 (emphasis added).
71. Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1975 (emphasis in original).
72. G. Smith, ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at A22, col. 3.
73. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Agreed Statement D, 23 U.S.T. at 3456, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503, at 22. The Agreed Statement may be read to permit deployment, in that unless
"specific limitations" are established, either pursuant to Articles XIII or XIV of the
Treaty, deployment is not prohibited. According to the Agreed Statement, limitations on
new ABM systems are subject to discussion; hence, if the United States and the Soviet
Union do not reach an agreement limiting or prohibiting future ABM systems, such systems technically may be deployed within the framework of Agreed Statement D. For the
position that deployment would violate the spirit of the Treaty, see supra note 66.
Even in 1982, prior to the present debate over the proper meaning of the Treaty, the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency maintained that "should future
technology bring forth new ABM systems 'based on other physical principles' than those
employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the Treaty's provisions for consultation and agreement." U.S.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREE-

MENTS 138 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added). Clearly, such a position does not advocate a
prohibition of testing or development. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
74. See Sofaer, supra note 5, at 6; Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1975.
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on other physical principles, and which Agreed Statement D defines as
being 'capable of substituting for' ABM missiles, launchers, and
75
radars.
This interpretation thus "avoids the difficulties of construction
created by the restrictive interpretation," and thereby establishes a coherent, nonredundant reading of the Treaty that:
(1) prohibits the deployment of all systems and components based at launch sites and derived from then-utilized
physical principles, except in the quantities and areas specifically permitted (article III); (2) prohibits the development,
testing, and deployment of all systems and components derived
from then-utilized physical principles other than those based
at launch sites (article V); (3) permits the creation of systems
and components based on other physical principles (Agreed
Statement D); and (4) prohibits the deployment of devices
based on other physical principles until agreement is reached
on specific limitations (Agreed Statement D).71
V.

THE

ABM

TREATY AND THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES

Although the more permissive interpretation of the treaty appears
to be the more accurate one, based on the examination of the language
of the agreement, ambiguities do exist. 77 Thus, to establish the precise
75.

Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1975. Judge Sofaer concludes:
If article II(1) encompassed all ABM systems and components, both those
based on then-utilized technology and those based on other physical principles,
then the Treaty-without Agreed Statement D-would ban the deployment of
all systems and components, present and future, except those particular systems
expressly permitted under article III. Agreed Statement D would have been unnecessary for this purpose.
Id. 1975-76 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). But see M. Smith, Space-Based
BMD, supra note 10, at 62. Smith argues that, while Agreed Statement D
is somewhat ambiguous, the provision for discussion on "specific limitations" on such systems implies an intention to include them within the general
treaty limitations on ABM systems and their components. If the Parties had
intended for no limitations to apply to such systems they would not have need
to use the word "specific." When read in conjunction with Article II, the most
reasonable interpretation of this agreement is that new technologies are included
within the ABM Treaty's limitations. If the Parties believe a new technology is
not adequately covered by the Treaty provisions they may request discussion on
specific limitations.
Id. (footnote omitted). For an opposing view, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying
text, and infra note 77.
76. Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1977.
77. Although Ambassador Smith maintains that Article V of the Treaty, under which
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meaning of the treaty, one first must determine the intention of the
78
parties by analyzing the "circumstances surrounding the agreement.
After examining the negotiating record 7 9 particularly the statements and drafts regarding future systems, Judge Sofaer concluded
that a much stronger case exists for the more permissive interpretation
of the Treaty than for the restrictive interpretation." The judge based
his decision on what each party sought to include in, and correspondingly, exclude from, the agreement. According to the record, the Sovithe parties agree not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components, is not
ambiguous, he does acknowledge the importance of construing the parties' intentions.
See G. Smith, ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at A22, col. 3. He notes that if ambiguities do
exist, however, they should be resolved by the Standing Consultative Commission: "[I]f
the Administration is concerned about some ambiguity in the negotiating record, it
should be recalled that the treaty anticipated this contingency and provided for consultational machinery to clarify any such situation." Id.
While Article XIII does provide for "consultational machinery" to resolve ambiguities, it does not bind either party to obligations based on the ambiguity in the absence of
such resolution. Alternatively, until the parties agree to the proper interpretation of the
ambiguity, whether the ambiguity exists in the text of the agreement or the negotiating
record, nothing is to preclude either party from making its own determination, in good
faith, as to the proper meaning. The absence of a joint resolution establishing the correct
interpretation should not act as a veto prohibiting the other party from adhering to its
bona fide interpretation. To allow ambiguities to preclude a party from making its own
good faith determination would permit the other party to avoid resolving the discrepancy, either by refusing to negotiate pursuant to Article XIII or by negotiating without a
true desire to reach an understanding. The power to veto through inaction or bad faith
negotiation, therefore, should not hinder the process of resolution.
78. See Sofaer, supra note 5, at 6; Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1978; M. Smith,
Space-Based BMD, supra note 10, at 62. See also supra notes 20-35 and accompanying
text.
79. Because the negotiating record is classified, knowledge of the events surrounding
the agreement is limited substantially to Judge Sofaer's review. Other accounts are offered by those who participated in the negotiations, including Ambassadors Nitze and
Smith, and various public officials with access to the classified materials. See Chayes &
Chayes, supra note 19, at 1966.
80. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 8; cf. id. at 3 ("My study of the Treaty has led me to
conclude that its language is ambiguous and can more reasonably be read to support a
broader interpretation."). Ambassador Nitze, who negotiated critical elements of the
Treaty, likewise states that a "conclusion that the Strategic Defense Initiative is a priori
inconsistent with the ABM Treaty does not reflect the intent and negotiating history of
the accord." NITZE, SDI AND ABM, supra note 58, at 2.
But see Wicker, supra note 3, at A27, col. 5. Wicker asserts that "the fundamental
issue here is not what the words may be read to mean, but what constitutes good faith
between nations." Id. While good faith undoubtedly is essential in treaty negotiation and
interpretation, Wicker seems to overlook the importance of language in treaty interpretation and, particularly when ambiguities exist, the need to evaluate the intention of the
parties who negotiated the agreement. For a brief analysis of treaty interpretation, see
supra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
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ets resisted any attempts to impose limits on systems or components
based on future technology.81 They were unwilling to bind themselves
to a ban on unknown devices or technology.82 The Soviets, however,
did consent to adopt Agreed Statement D, but only upon pressure
from the United States Delegation." Although the United States
sought a more comprehensive ban, the agreement was not viewed as a
prohibition on the development or testing of future systems or components. "[Blecause the Soviets succeeded in avoiding a broad binding
commitment regarding the development and testing of.
.components based on future technology we cannot properly be said to be
bound by such a commitment."8 5
What is known of the negotiating record, then, indicates that the
more permissive interpretation of the treaty reflects more accurately
the parties' intentions. Therefore, the ABM Treaty, based on the language of the agreement and the intentions of the parties, does not prohibit the development or testing of the technology presently being considered as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative."8
81. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 8; Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1979. Although the
United States sought initially to ban the development and testing of non-land based
systems and components based on future applications of "other physical principles," the
Soviets resisted such attempts, particularly with respect to laser technology. Sofaer, SDI,
supra note 38, at 1979.
82. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 8-9; see Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1979 ("The Soviets' arguments rested both on their repeatedly expressed unwillingness to deal with unknown devices or technology and on their belief that the parties could not effectively
regulate devices that had not yet been created.").
83. Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1979. Judge Sofaer concludes that:
The furthest the Soviets were willing to go with respect to regulating systems or components based on other physical principles was to adopt a side
agreement (Agreed Statement D) prohibiting the deployment of any such systems and components prior to formal discussion between and agreement by the
parties on specific limitations.
.. .Indeed, the United States negotiators ultimately persuaded the Soviets to adopt Agreed Statement D by explaining that
without it, the Treaty would leave the parties free to deploy future systems or
components based on other physical principles.
Id. (emphasis in original). See Sofaer, supra note 5, at 9. For the view that even
deployment may not be prohibited, see supra note 73.
84. See Sofaer, SDI, supra note 38, at 1979 (the Soviets specifically sought to prevent
broad definitions of the terms "ABM system" and "components," and "the United
States acceded to their wishes."). See supra notes 81-83.
85. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 10.
86. According to Ambassador Nitze, the Treaty was not intended to be "locked in
concrete. When we and the Soviets were crafting the agreement, we envisaged a living
accord-that is, one that would make allowance for and adapt to future circumstances.
This was particularly so, given that the Treaty was to be of unlimited duration." NITZE,
SDI AND ABM, supra note 58, at 2. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XV(1), 23 U.S.T.
at 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12 ("This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.").
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VI.

PREMISES OF THE

ABM

TREATY

Even if the ABM Treaty is read to prohibit the development and
testing of systems and components within the scope of the SDI program (that is, even if the Treaty's more restrictive interpretation is
deemed correct), the United States may not, nevertheless, be bound by
its terms. Notwithstanding any Soviet violations of the Treaty,
whether actual or alleged,' 7 the United States and the Soviet Union
ratified the Treaty upon express conditions set forth in the preamble
and Article XI of the Treaty and subsequent unilateral statements.8 8
The Treaty's preamble states that "the limitation of anti-ballistic
missile systems .

.

.

would contribute to the creation of more

favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic
arms." 9 This suggests, as does the preamble's preceding language,9"
that limitations on ABM systems were made contingent on the premise
that both parties would "take effective measures towards reductions on
strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general complete disarmament."" In even stronger and more explicit language, Article XI states
that "[t]he Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. '' 9 The purpose of such negotiaEven though the Treaty was intended to be of unlimited duration, it was not intended to apply to unforeseen occurrences. See supra note 82. Agreed Statement D recognizes that the United States and the Soviet Union, "even in 1972, foresaw the possibility of changes in the strategic situation-including the possibility of new defense
technologies in the future." NITZE, SDI AND ABM, supra note 58, at 2. The parties therefore drafted an amendment provision so that the Treaty would be adaptable to new
circumstances. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIV(1), 23 U.S.T. at 3445, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503, at 11.
87. See generally WHITE HOUSE REPORT ON SOVIET STRATEGIc DEFENSE (1985); NITZE,
SDI AND ABM, supra note 58; COMMON CAUSE, supra note 8.
88. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. Four Unilateral Statements made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation, drafted
from July 1970 to May 1972, accompany the Treaty. See infra note 95.
89. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 at 3.
90. The preamble states that limitations on "anti-ballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a
decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." Id., 23 U.S.T. at
3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. See infra text accompanying note 93. Subsequent language indicates that such limitations are an essential ingredient to the "cessation of the nuclear
arms race." ABM Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3438, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 at
4. See also supra note 43.
91. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3438, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
92. Id., art. XI, 23 U.S.T. at 3443, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 at 9. The United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency's position is that ratification of the ABM Treaty was
linked not only to the 1972 Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms, but also to
future negotiations for limiting strategic offensive arms. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 73, at 135.
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tions, as the preamble indicates, is to curb the race in strategic offensive arms and decrease the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear
weapons.9" However, these negotiations have not been actively continued, and those that have taken place since the SALT I and SALT II
agreements have not yielded the goals sought by the ABM Treaty. The
United States, therefore, has the grounds to withdraw from the
9
treaty. 4

Ambassador Smith stated in his May 9, 1972 Unilateral State93. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 at 3.
94. Dr. G.A. Keyworth, II, the Science Advisor to the President, and Ambassador
Nitze agree that the Treaty was entered into contingent upon conditions that have not
been fulfilled. Keyworth states that "[wie assumed that the ABM Treaty would be the
catalyst for mutual reductions in offensive arms, and we expected to see some progress
within five years. . . .It never happened. Instead of getting the reductions we hoped
the treaty would bring, we got the proliferation we feared the missile defenses would
bring.....
" G.A. Keyworth II, SDI: Worth Holding Onto, Proposed Remarks to the
Association of Old Crows at the Electronic Defense Association in Washington D.C. (Oct.
1, 1985) (available at N.Y.L. Sch. J. of Int'l & Comp. L. Office) [hereinafter Keyworth,
SDI]. "So SDI is really a response to the failure of expectations for arms control." Id.
Ambassador Nitze likewise notes that when the United States agreed to limits on
ABM systems, it did so under the assumption that such limitations would "make possible reductions on and comprehensive constraints on offensive missile forces." NITZE, SDI
AND ABM, supra note 58, at 2. In even stronger language, Nitze asserts that "we have
been unable to achieve the reductions and limitations with regard to offensive nuclear
arms that were envisaged-indeed, on which the ABM Treaty was premised-when the
treaty was signed in 1972. As a result, strategic offensive nuclear forces are substantially
greater today than they were then." Id. The Ambassador states also that the SALT
agreements have failed to "promote and maintain an equitable and stable balance in
offensive nuclear arms." Id.
Since 1972, while generally remaining within the numerical limits on
launchers provided by the expired Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the
unratified SALT II Treaty, the Soviets have increased the number of warheads
on their strategic ballistic missiles by a factor of four. Moreover, they have increased the capability of their missile force to attack hardened military targets
by more than tenfold. This poses a serious and destabilizing threat to our retaliatory forces.
Id.
In the event that this threat endangers the "supreme interests" of the United States,
Article XV provides a mechanism by which either party may withdraw from the Treaty.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
Secretary of State Shultz likewise argues that when the ABM Treaty was signed,
it was assumed that tight limits on defensive systems would make possible
real reductions in strategic offensive arms. But the Soviet Union has never
agreed to any meaningful reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Instead, it has
continued an unprecedented military buildup. . . .The strategy of reliance
on offensive retaliations to preserve deterrence and prevent war is being called
into question.
Excerpts from U.N. Speech by Shultz and Shevardnadze, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at
A8, col. 1.
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ment, "[i]f an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme
interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a
basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty... 5 Article XV(2) of the
Treaty provides the escape clause alluded to by the Ambassador for
either party, in the event "that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.",0
Any such determination, including one based on the failure to fulfill
the Article XI and preamble requirements of the Treaty, gives that
party the right to withdraw from the Treaty.97 Since these conditions
have not been fulfilled,ss the United States has the right to abrogate
the ABM Treaty.
VII.

CONCLUSION

It is by no means established (beyond doubt) that the Strategic
Defense Initiative is commercially viable, let alone scientifically feasible. Even if the advanced defense system can become a reality, there is
also little agreement as to whether the program should be pursued.
Nevertheless, because of the ambiguities in the text and the circumstances and intentions surrounding the drafting of the agreement, the
United States can, and indeed should, continue to "guide by the light
of reason" and proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative. We must
95. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Unilateral Statement A, 23 U.S.T. at 3459-60,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503 at 25-26. The four Unilateral Statements made during the negotiation
of the Treaty "were intended to clarify specific provisions of the agreements or parts of
the negotiating record." ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 73,
at 136. Though they are not necessarily binding as law, the Unilateral Statements did
accompany the ABM Treaty when it was submitted to the Congress. Id. at 135. Thus,
Ambassador Smith's May 9, 1972 Unilateral Statement was recognized by the Congress
as a condition upon which the Treaty was negotiated.
96. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XV(2), 23 U.S.T. at 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
97. Id.
98. No meaningful agreements were entered into within five years of the signing of
the ABM Treaty. Even SALT II, an agreement to which the United States has adhered
despite the fact that it was never ratified by the Senate, was not completed until 1979,
seven years after the ABM Treaty was signed. Regardless, SALT II has not been an
effective limitation on offensive nuclear arms within the meaning of the ABM Treaty's
preamble and Articles I and XI. See supra note 94. Moreover, since SALT II was negotiated, there has been no "agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms
limitations." ABM Treaty, supra note 2, Unilateral Statement A, 23 U.S.T. at 3459-60,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503. Therefore, the conditions upon which the ABM Treaty was premised
have not been realized and, correspondingly, the "supreme interests" of the United
States have been jeopardized.
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"let our minds be bold" so that we may find the answers to our new
great question.
Robert L. Meyers

